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In Whole Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt the Supreme Court of the United 
States passed down its most important decision on abortion in just under 
a decade. By a majority of 5-3, the Court ruled that two provisions in a 
Texas law regulating abortion on grounds of women’s health were 
constitutionally invalid, placing a ‘substantial obstacle’ in the way of 
women seeking to exercise their right to abortion. This comment 
delineates the key ways in which the Court’s application of the standard of 
constitutional review under Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992) to the 
Texas provisions marks a landmark development for the protection of the 
constitutional right to abortion established in Roe v Wade, not the least by 
making clear that state abortion regulations which cite ‘women’s health’ 
justifications should not pass constitutional review where those 
justifications lack a credible factual basis. 
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‘TRAP’ LAWS AND HOUSE BILL 2 
 
Whole Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt1 is without doubt the most important 
US Supreme Court decision on abortion in little under a decade, and 
arguably the most important since the Court’s fundamental restatement 
of the abortion right in Planned Parenthood v Casey in 1992.2 At the end 
of its term in June, the Court ruled by a majority of 5-3 to strike down as 
unconstitutional two provisions in a 2013 Texas law regulating abortion 
on the ground that they failed to meet the Casey standard of constitutional 
review by placing an ‘undue burden’ on Texan women seeking abortions. 
The provisions in question were an ‘ambulatory surgical center 
requirement’, which essentially required abortion clinics to meet the 
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design standards of medical centres intended for more complicated, 
hospital-level treatments, and an ‘admitting privileges requirement’, 
which demanded that doctors in abortion clinics have standing 
agreements with doctors in nearby hospitals that would allow them to 
have abortion patients admitted in the event of complications, rather than 
presenting at an emergency room and being admitted the usual way. Both 
of these requirements are extremely difficult for abortion clinics to meet. 
So much so, the petitioners argued, that the effect of their enforcement 
would be to close down a great many abortion clinics, obstructing abortion 
access for a large number of Texan women.  
 
 For those familiar with US abortion politics, these closures were of 
course transparently the purpose of Texas’s ‘House Bill 2’ statute (‘HB 2’).3  
HB 2 is just one example of a US regulatory trend known to abortion 
rights advocates as ‘Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers’, or ‘TRAP’ 
laws. TRAP laws, it is widely believed, aim to use putatively health-based 
regulations to force the closure of abortion clinics – in effect, regulating 
them to rubble. In the eyes of many, they amount to what Reva Siegel and 
Linda Greenhouse have called ‘abortion exceptionalism’: the hyper-
regulation of abortion treatment within the medical profession with 
obvious political motivation. 4  TRAP law provisions are diverse and 
multitudinous, and can range from the specification of minimum hall 
widths, to additional medical suites, to the difficult-to-obtain admitting 
privileges.  
 
The evidence suggests that TRAP laws can be extremely effective in 
their ostensible political purpose, and House Bill 2 was no exception. For 
one example, in 2014, the sole remaining abortion clinic in the state of 
Mississippi was left fighting to remain open after an admitting-privileges 
law threatened to close it down, as a result of which a Fifth Circuit court 
concluded that the law would impose an undue burden on women seeking 
abortion (Jackson Women’s Health Org. v Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457-58 
(5th Cir. 2014)). Indeed, prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Whole 
Woman’s Health, the Federal District Court in Texas issued an injunction 
to block the enforcement of the provisions, citing evidence that the number 
of abortion clinics in the state had reduced from more than forty to half of 
that after the admitting-privileges requirement took effect in 2013.5 That 
injunction was subsequently stayed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
although the Supreme Court quickly blocked the stay pending its review.6 
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The provision’s continuing effect, as the Supreme Court noted in its 
majority judgment, would reduce the number of functioning abortion 
clinics to seven or eight in the whole of Texas, left to service an 
approximate 60-72,000 Texas women who seek abortion each year.7  
 
The effect of these closures on travel distances for women was also 
considerable, given the state’s vastness, evidence for which was 
acknowledged by the District Court when granting the initial injunction. 
The District Court had found that the decrease in geographical 
distribution of abortion clinics since enforcement of the admitting 
privileges requirement doubled the number of women living more than 50 
miles from an abortion clinic, and increased those living more than 100 
miles from a clinic by 150%, those living more than 150 miles has 
increased by more than 350%, and those living more than 200 miles has 
increased by about 2,800%.8 An Amicus Curiae Brief submitted to the 
Supreme Court by Jane’s Due Process, a charity which helps Texan 
minors through the judicial proceedings needed to obtain an abortion 
without parental notification, summarized the effects as follows: 
 
From San Angelo, a city with a university and military base, the 
nearest open clinic is in excess of 200 miles and three-hour drive one 
way. From Lubbock, a city with a major public university of 
approximately 35,000 students, the nearest open clinic is in excess of 
300 miles and a four-and-a-half hour drive one way…the nearest 
New Mexico clinic is even farther. There is no public transport 
service to connect many small towns to larger ones. Bus service from 
the larger towns to the remaining clinics is infrequent and even more 
time consuming.9 
 
Some Texan legislators were brazen about the fact that the real purpose of 
HB 2, which was claimed to create health-protective abortion regulations, 
was in truth to obstruct abortion altogether by setting up abortion clinics 
for failure. Not long after the bill was sent to the state legislature, the 
Republican Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst tweeted a photo of a 
map that showed all of the abortion clinics that would close as a result of 
the bill, accompanied by the caption: ‘We fought to pass [HB 2] thru the 
Senate last night, & this is why!’.10 The political background of HB 2 is 
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therefore that it was both widely intended to drastically reduce the 
number of abortion clinics in the state, and had proven success in that 
aim, and in significantly encumbering women seeking abortion.  
 
 
WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v HELLERSTEDT 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision on the constitutionality of HB 2 turned 
crucially on applying the standard of review for abortion legislation set 
down in Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992), which had modified the 
original standard of review set down in Roe v Wade (1973), the landmark 
case that initially recognised the protected status of the right to 
abortion.11 Casey affirmed the central ruling in Roe that abortion, as an 
element of procreative liberty, was part of the fundamental right to 
“privacy” found in the 9th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution. Also 
like Roe, however, the Casey Court held the right to abortion to be a 
qualified right, and recognised that the state had legitimate interests in 
regulating abortion either for the protection of fetal life or the protection of 
women’s health. Casey held that before the point of fetal viability, abortion 
legislation could therefore be enacted for these purposes, but only so long 
as the regulations did not constitute an ‘undue burden’ on the right to 
abortion by placing a ‘substantial obstacle’ in the way of women trying to 
obtain it. States could not further their legitimate aims in a way that was 
consistent with the abortion right where regulations entailed creating 
such an obstacle. Moreover, and extremely relevant to Whole Woman’s 
Health, the Court stated that ‘unnecessary health regulations that have 
the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman 
seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.’ 12  
 
Applying the Casey standard of constitutional review to HB 2’s 
ambulatory surgical centre and admitting privileges requirements 
therefore involved asking two key questions. First, were the requirements 
in pursuit of a legitimate aim, in the way of protecting women’s health? 
And second, did they either in ‘purpose or effect’ impose an ‘undue burden’ 
on women seeking abortion, by placing a ‘substantial obstacle’ in their 
path? 
 
In a majority opinion that was surely as satisfying to defenders of 
abortion rights as it was alarming to their opponents, Justice Breyer 
systematically dismantled Texas’s dubitable claims that the provisions 
really were in the service of protecting women’s health, and demonstrated 
that that they did, beyond question, place a substantial obstacle on women 
seeking abortion. Beginning with the admitting privileges requirement, 
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the decision relayed the well of evidential support for the conclusion that 
it did not in fact bring about any meaningful health benefits for women. 
This largely owed to the fact that the admitting privileges were redundant 
in the case of almost all abortions, both because complications arising 
from abortion rarely require hospital admissions, and because in the 
unusual case where a patient did need to go to hospital, no added benefit 
resulted from admitting privileges.13 Justice Breyer underscored that fact 
that Texas had even been forced to admit in oral argument that it could 
not adduce a single instance where an admitting privilege had made a 
difference to a health outcome.14  
 
 While there was no evidence of a health benefit attending the 
admitting privileges requirement—the purported legitimate state aim—
there was significant evidence that the regulation imposed a substantial 
obstacle on women seeking abortion. For more than one reason, admitting 
privileges are extremely difficult for abortion doctors to obtain, meaning 
that the enforcement of the provision resulted in the closure of a large 
number of clinics. As Justice Breyer explained, one of the reasons that 
abortion clinics so struggled to obtain admitting privileges was that they 
are conditional on a certain number of admissions per year – women who 
needed to be transferred to hospitals. However, abortion being as safe as it 
is, doctors who perform only abortions were unable meet that quota. He 
writes: ‘In a word, doctors would be unable to maintain admitting 
privileges or obtain those privileges for the future, because the fact that 
abortions are so safe meant that providers were unlikely to have any 
patients to admit’.15  
 
The effects of the provision on abortion access could be seen from 
the evidence of the clinic closures to date, which, when viewed alongside 
the average number of abortions in Texas, the capacity of the remaining 
abortion clinics, the inevitable effects of longer waiting times, and farther 
travel distances for abortion, led the majority to conclude that the undue 
burden test was unquestionably met.16 
 
 Turning to the surgical centre requirement, the majority pointed to 
‘considerable evidence’ that the requirement does not benefit patients and 
is medically unnecessary.17 Referring again to the findings of the District 
Court, the majority argued that there was no good evidence to suggest 
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that women would obtain better health outcomes at ASCs than they do at 
ordinarily licensed abortion clinics. In the case of medically induced 
abortions (abortions procured using drugs), the ASC requirement would 
make no difference at all, since complications are only ever likely to arise 
once the patient has already left the facility.18 More importantly though, 
the Court emphasised the fact that abortion procedures are far safer than 
numerous procedures taking place at facilities not subject to ASC 
requirements – including colonoscopy, liposuction and, not the least, 
childbirth. 19  (It was pointed out that colonoscopy a procedure which 
typically takes place out of an ASC environment, has a mortality rate 10 
times higher than that of abortion, and liposuction a mortality rate 28 
times higher.) The majority took these comparisons as strong evidence 
that the surgical centre provision is not grounded in differences between 
abortion and other surgical procedures that are ‘reasonably related to 
preserving women’s health’.20 Furthermore, some ASC provisions, such as 
ones designed to safeguard heavily sedated patients during fire 
emergencies, simply had no application whatsoever to abortion facilities, 
which do not typically put patients under general anaesthetic.21  
 
 Again then, the record evidence supported the conclusion that the 
requirement was not in the interest of improving women’s health. And 
again, it was held, the provision created a ‘substantial obstacle’ for women 
seeking abortion, the District Court findings being that the costs an ordinary 
abortion clinic would have to incur to meet the surgical center requirements 
were considerable, ranging from $1 million-$3 million;22 that the requirement 
would reduce the total number of abortion facilities to seven or eight, and 
that the idea that these remaining facilities could cater for the 60-72,000 
Texan women who seek abortion each year was implausible.23 Texas had 
argued that there was no good evidence to suggest that the remaining 
abortion clinics could not increase their current capacity to meet the 
increased demand. The majority, however, dismissed that argument, 
regarding it to be pure ‘common sense’ that the existing facilities would 
not be able to meet many times their existing demand without expanding 
or incurring significant costs. By analogy, the majority argued, it may be 
‘conceivable’ that a certain grocery store which we know serves 200 
customers per week could easily provide for 1000 customers at no 
significant additional cost or delay, it is highly unlikely. Equally, it was 
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intuitively reasonable to suppose that the existing clinics could not 
operate at many times their current demand without compromising the 
service.24 
 
Justice Breyer argued further that the quality of care for women at the 
overstretched facilities was surely likely to decline as a result of the ASC 
requirement. In summation, he stated, ‘in the face of no threat to women’s 
health, Texas seeks to force women to travel long distances to get 
abortions in crammed-to-capacity super-facilities’. 25  The majority thus 
concluded that the ASC requirement, like the admitting privileges 
requirement, provided few if any health benefits to women, imposed a 
substantial obstacle on women seeking abortion, and thus constituted an 
‘undue burden’ on the abortion right.26 Filing an additional concurring 
judgment, Justice Ginsburg described it as being ‘beyond rational belief’ 
that HB 2 would actually enhance women’s health, and practically certain 
that it would substantially impede abortion access. 27  Justice Ginsburg 
made the further important point, echoed in the majority opinion, that 
when safe provision is unavailable, women are more likely to jeopardise 
their health by resorting to rogue practitioners, making it even less 
credible that the effect of the requirements would be to enhance women’s 
health.28  
 
 
THE HEALTH JUSTIFICATION 
 
Whole Woman’s Health was a hugely significant development in the 
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence in more than one way. The 
Court’s reasoning demonstrated a notably more hawkish application of the 
Casey test for constitutional abortion regulation than it had, as yet, clearly 
endorsed. The reasoning behind its invalidation of HB 2 appeared to 
intensify that standard of scrutiny in some key respects, although in ways 
which are arguably truer to the standard of review laid down in Casey 
than its less demanding iterations. 
 
 The most obviously salient feature of the Court’s reasoning was its 
willingness to interrogate the factual basis of HB 2’s health-based 
justification, and its reliance on detailed evidence to conclude that it 
would not in fact promote women’s health. The first prong of the Casey 
test asks whether a pre-viability abortion regulation is for the furtherance 
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of a legitimate state aim, of which there are two: protection of fetal life 
and protection of women’s health. The majority opinion made clear that 
the Court was unwilling to find that the legitimate aim test is met simply 
because a state attests that the measure was intended to be health-
protective, when compelling evidence suggests that it will not in reality 
confer health benefits. The Court refused to simply take Texas’s claim that 
the two provisions were in the interest of women’s health at face value and 
move quickly on to ask whether they presented a substantial obstacle to 
abortion (the second limb of the test), when the purported justification was 
so highly improbable to begin with.  
 
On the face of it, scrutinising the factual basis for the initial 
regulatory justification is an integral part of applying the first stage of the 
Casey standard of review. As Casey stated, ‘unnecessary health 
regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial 
obstacle’ on the abortion right would amount to an undue burden. The 
best way to probe whether a health regulation is ‘unnecessary’ is to 
determine whether it is in fact likely to promote health. Evidence for the 
health justification is also clearly material to the question of legislative 
‘purpose’, since the weaker the factual basis for the health justification, 
the more warranted is the conclusion that the true purpose of the 
legislation was to obstruct abortion. 
 
 However, the appropriateness of the Court’s investigation into the 
factual basis for HB 2’s health-based justification was itself a contentious 
issue in the case, and one of the focal points for the dissenting justices. 
Departing from the majority, Justice Thomas argued that the Court had, 
up until now, given state and federal legislatures a wide discretion when 
legislating on matters of ‘medical uncertainty’.29 Justice Thomas relied on 
the last landmark abortion case, Gonzales v Carhart,30 as authority for the 
proposition that wherever justifications for an abortion law are debatable, 
the Court ought to defer to the legislature. To do otherwise, he argued, 
would hold the legislature to too ‘exacting a standard’.31 In Gonzales, the 
Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the federal ‘Partial 
Birth Abortion Ban Act 2003’, which placed a near-absolute prohibition on 
a particularly controversial method of late abortion. The factual dispute 
there was whether the partial-birth method could ever be medically 
necessary, in which case banning it could not be constitutional under 
Casey, even post-viability, for Casey required all post-viability abortion 
bans to contain exceptions where abortion was necessary to safeguard the 
health or life of the pregnant woman. Some medical opinion disagreed 
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with Congress on this question, testifying, contrary to the ‘congressional 
findings’ cited in the Act, that the partial-birth procedure would in some 
cases be the safest method of performing an abortion.32 The majority of the 
Court ruled that it was, however, required to defer to Congress’s 
determination on a question that was ‘medically uncertain’—the debatable 
health benefits of partial-birth abortion—and assume that no such 
benefits obtained.33 
 
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Fifth Circuit, which had earlier ruled 
to stay the injunction on the enforcement of the two provisions, had also 
invoked Gonzales to argue for a deferential ‘rational basis’ standard of 
review, which takes it to be improper for the judiciary to examine the 
factual basis of a state’s claim that its abortion regulations promote 
women’s health.34 According to Justice Thomas, the majority opinion of 
the Supreme Court ‘ratcheted up’ the standard of review of abortion 
legislation by requiring more than just a rational basis for a health-
protective abortion regulation, a test which presumably would only ask if 
the legislature was aiming at health-protection with its measures, not 
whether it was succeeding.35 Rather, he argued, by examining the factual 
basis for the health justification, the Court intensified the level of review 
beyond that which Casey endorsed. 
 
 However, while the Court’s scrutiny of the factual basis for Texas’s 
health-protective provisions was perhaps more rigorous than had been 
seen before, it can be argued that it constituted no departure from 
precedent, or any additional gloss on the Casey standard. As Greenhouse 
and Siegel detail, numerous lower court rulings reviewing abortion 
legislation had taken it as read that ‘Casey requires inquiry into the facts 
that justify laws targeting abortion for onerous health restrictions’, with 
only the Fifth Circuit departing from this norm. 36  Justice Thomas’s 
conclusion that such fact-finding ‘ratchets up’ the standard of review is 
therefore dubitable, especially when one considers the obvious relation of 
the evidential basis for a health-protective measure to the legislature’s 
rational basis for enacting that measure. Indeed, one might well question 
whether a Court can properly impute to a legislature a rational basis for 
                                                        
32 Although the majority considered there to be a division of medical opinion on the 
matter (see n 34 above, 54), see Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting judgment (at 49-73) in 
which she explains that the medical consensus was in fact in favour of the banned 
procedure and supportive of its health benefits (at 55-57), and that the ‘facts’ supported 
in the ‘congressional findings’ did not ‘withstand inspection’, including by the testimony 
of the government’s own witnesses (at 55). 
 
33 ibid, 33. 
 
34 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014), at 590, 594-99. 
 
35 Whole Woman’s Health, n 1 above, 56. 
 
36 Greenhouse and Siegel, n 4 above, 1433. 
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an abortion restriction, grounded in either the aim of protecting fetal life 
or of protecting women’s health, whilst deferring entirely to the legislature 
on the matter of facts and evidence.  
 
Even the rational basis question cannot be wholly severed from the 
relevant facts whilst still retaining any bite, since whether or not a 
measure is rationally connected to a particular end is always, ultimately, 
fact-dependent. This can be brought out simply by thinking about what it 
would take to fail a pure ‘rational basis’ test for a regulatory justification. 
To use a silly example, we might imagine that Texas had enacted a 
provision to demand that elephants must be brought into abortion clinics 
for the protection of women’s health. The suggestion that the presence of 
elephants at abortion clinics could in any way enhance women’s health is 
an obvious absurdity. But how would one argue as much, in the face of a 
legislature’s insistence to the contrary? The only way would be to draw 
attention to the fact that no evidence supports the connection between 
elephants and better health outcomes in abortion, and that no intuitive 
reason can be given for believing that it does.   
 
 This was essentially what the Supreme Court majority argued 
about the admitting privileges and ASC requirements. Justice Breyer’s 
main point was that the evidence made it highly implausible that the two 
provisions would operate in effect to promote women’s health. And how 
else, it might be asked, was the Court supposed to show that that first 
limb of the Casey test was not met, since it will always be open to states to 
claim that a measure is in pursuit of a health-protective aim, even if the 
notion that it will do so is preposterous. Denying the Court the ability to 
scrutinise the factual basis of the health-justification would in effect be to 
make the legitimate aim limb of the test entirely perfunctory, a result 
which Casey cannot have intended. 
  
 As an objection to this point, it may be pointed out that it was only 
medically debatable or uncertain questions of fact on which Justice 
Thomas argued the Court was bound to defer to the legislature, relying on 
the authority on Gonzales. The Court in Gonzales, we saw, had considered 
itself barred from passing judgment on ‘medically uncertain’ questions 
about which the legislature has made a determination – the ‘uncertain’ 
issue there being whether the partial-birth abortion procedure in 
particular could ever be necessary to protect women’s health. However, 
Whole Woman’s Health can be distinguished from Gonzales on this point. 
Here, the majority did not regard the putative health benefits of the two 
provisions as medically debatable, but as wholly implausible, given the 
evidence. It was not the case that the Court first recognised conflicting 
medical opinion on the question of the health justification and then 
decided to prefer one body of opinion, against the preference of the 
legislature. Rather, the culmination of the argument was that there was 
no medical uncertainty. It was beyond reason—indeed, beyond ‘common 
sense’—to imagine that HB 2’s provisions would do anything other than 
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further compromise the health of women undergoing abortions. In 
Carhart, it was only once the Court had accepted that medical opinion was 
indeed divided on the health benefits of partial-birth abortion that 
deference to the legislature was considered appropriate, on the premise 
that ‘[t]he Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to 
pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific 
uncertainty.’37 This trigger for judicial deference did not occur in Whole 
Woman’s Health, where no medical and scientific uncertainty was 
acknowledged. To defer to the legislature in the face of the complete lack 
of evidence for the health justification would have been to give it unbridled 
scope to pass any abortion regulation which does not substantially impede 
abortion access just by claiming that it is for the protection of women’s 
health, practically eliminating the first stage of constitutional review 
under Casey. 
 
As Siegel and Greenhouse helpfully point out, it is also possible to 
draw guidance from the Casey decision itself about how to apply its 
standard of review to putatively health-protective abortion regulations.38 
Only one of the provisions at issue in Casey had the purported aim of 
protecting women’s health (all the others being justified by the alternative 
legitimate aim of ‘protecting fetal life’). This was a reporting requirement 
that Pennsylvania had imposed on all doctors performing abortions. In 
determining that the reporting requirement was indeed a necessary 
health restriction, the Court was particularly influenced by the fact that 
the requirement conforms to the general standards of medical regulation 
outside of the abortion context. In other words, the fact that exactly the 
same medical regulation applied to other medical procedures of equal 
complexity was the best evidence there was that the provision was 
medically necessary, and not merely intended to obstruct abortion. As 
Justice Breyer’s comparisons with other procedures elucidated, the same 
was evidently not true of Texas’s admitting privileges and ASC 
requirements, 
 
 
 
THE SUBSTANTIAL OBSTACLE TEST 
 
As we saw, the standard of constitutional review under Casey looks to 
both the justification for abortion regulation and its effects. As well as 
questioning the veracity of the health-based justification, the Supreme 
Court found that the two provisions had the prohibited effect of imposing a 
substantial obstacle on women seeking abortion. A notable aspect of this 
part of the ruling was the majority’s attentiveness to the compound effect 
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38 Greenhouse and Siegel, n 4 above, 1438-1444. 
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of the two provisions on access to abortion. As Justice Breyer opined, 
increased driving distances may not in and of themselves constitute an 
undue burden (something for which Casey was an authority39); however, 
they might nevertheless constitute one additional burden which, when 
taken together with all of the other effects of the clinic closures, add up to 
a substantial obstacle.40 Considering the compound effect of the provisions 
demonstrated the Court’s intention to take the substantial obstacle test 
under Casey seriously by considering the overall effects of the provisions 
on women seeking abortions. This was an important clarification of the 
second stage of constitutional review. Any obstructive effect, when taken 
in isolation, might not appear substantial. But a true test of whether or 
not the provisions unduly burdened the abortion right could only proceed 
by taking all of the effects together: the clinic closures, the increased 
travelling distances, the higher costs, and so on. 
 
 In fact, the argument could be made that the second stage of 
constitutional review warrants an even broader appraisal than that which 
the Supreme Court conducted. Whether or not the provisions impose a 
substantial obstacle on exercising the abortion right in truth depends not 
only on their combined effects, but on their combined effects when taken 
together with other limitations on abortion access not related to the 
provisions. When assessing its impact on the abortion right, HB 2’s 
disputed provisions cannot be viewed in isolation from the various other 
abortion-restrictive legislation enacted in Texas over the past few years. 
These include: cuts to family planning services, a ban on state funding for 
anyone or any institution ‘affiliated’ with an abortion provider;41 so-called 
‘informed consent’ requirements, such as mandatory ultrasound 24 hours 
ahead of the abortion procedure, and the required viewing of a state-
printed pamphlet describing gestational development and the risks of 
abortion.42 It could be argued that any serious consideration of the impact 
of the admitting privileges and ASC requirements must consider them in 
the context of these multitudinous regulations and account for the 
exacerbating effects of some burdens upon others. For example, even if 
driving 150 miles is not, in isolation, a substantial obstacle (itself a 
doubtful conclusion), the need to drive 150 miles and stay overnight, or to 
make two separate trips, so as to satisfy the waiting period requirement, 
might well be. 
 
                                                        
39 Casey, n 2 above, 885-887. 
 
40 ibid, 31. 
 
41 See, Tex. Hum. Res. Code ss 32.02(c-1) and 25 Tex. Admin. Code ss 39.31, 39.38. 
 
42 See the Women’s Right to Know Act 2011, Tex. Gen. Laws 342 (codified at Tex. Health 
& Safety Code ch. 171). 
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 Texas had also claimed that the two disputed provisions did not 
impose a substantial obstacle on the abortion right because they did not 
burden a ‘large fraction’ of Texan women, a condition which formed part of 
Casey’s undue burden test.43 Justice Breyer rebutted this argument by 
claiming that on the right reading of Casey, the imposition did not have to 
effect a ‘large fraction’ of all Texan women of reproductive age, but only a 
large fraction of women for whom the provisions are relevant.44 It would be 
enough to meet this test that a large fraction of all of the women for whom 
the restrictions were indeed relevant were substantially impeded by them. 
This reading is clearly the more consistent with Casey’s aim to invalidate 
abortion regulations which create an undue burden for those exercising 
the abortion right. A standard of review which invalidates only those 
regulations that impede the abortion right for a large fraction of all 
women (or all women of reproductive age), many of whom would find the 
regulations personally negligible, cannot ensure adequate protection for 
those who truly need it – the rights-bearers that count. The only way to 
determine whether or not the rights infringement was ‘substantial’ was to 
ask whether it is substantial for those whom it affects.  
 
 
 
 
THE ‘WEIGHTED BALANCING’ TEST 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the majority opinion looked not 
only to whether each stage of constitutional review was passed 
independently, but applied Casey in a way which weighed the strength of 
the regulatory justification against the imposition on the abortion right, 
asking whether, when taken together, the regulation amounted to an 
undue burden. For instance, regarding the increased travelling distances, 
the majority held that they not only constituted one additional burden 
along with the other burdens created by the clinic closures, but that 
furthermore, ‘when viewed in light of the virtual absence of any health 
benefit’, led to the conclusion that the requirement was an undue 
burden.45  Critically, the undue burden test is not here carried out in 
isolation from the strength of the justification. Rather, what amounts to 
an undue imposition is treated as a relative determination about whether 
the extent of the burden on women is warranted by the strength of the 
regulatory justification. The weaker the health justification, the more 
ready the Court was to find that the burdens it entailed were undue. 
 
                                                        
43 Casey, n 2 above, 894-895. 
 
44 Whole Woman’s Health, n 1 above, 39. 
 
45 Whole Woman’s Health, n 1 above, 4. 
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 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas described this application 
of the undue burden test, which considered the burdens an abortion law 
imposes along with its benefits, as one of the ways in which the majority 
‘radically rewrites’ the Casey standard. In his opinion, Casey did not 
endorse the balancing of benefits and burdens, but merely asked firstly 
whether a legitimate state interest was in play, and secondly, whether the 
regulation imposed a substantial obstacle on rights-bearers.46 
  
 Much clearly hangs on the Court’s willingness to employ what 
Greenhouse and Siegel have termed the ‘weighted balancing test’,47 or 
what in European human rights jurisprudence is known as 
‘proportionality’: the demand that infringements of fundamental rights are 
proportionate to the legitimate aims those restrictions seek to effect. 
Clearly, a test which treats the undue burden question as a 
proportionality issue is a more demanding standard of scrutiny than one 
which takes the legitimate aim and substantial obstacle questions 
independently. On a standard which treats ‘undue’ as synonymous with 
‘disproportionate’, the obstructing impact of an abortion measure need not 
even be substantial to be constitutionally invalid, but only not worth the 
trade-off if the benefits of the law are weak or dubious enough.  
 
However, it can be argued that a necessary part of considering 
whether an abortion burden is ‘undue’ is to ask whether its benefits are 
worth its costs in terms of rights infringement, and that the Court’s 
formulation of Casey on this point is a better fit for protection of 
fundamental constitutional rights. Burdens on rights can be ‘undue’ in 
more than one way, either by passing a threshold of excessiveness or by 
being unwarranted because they are pointless or not adequately 
counterbalanced. By deploying the weighted balancing test, the Supreme 
Court’s approach to abortion rights protection reflect some of the 
proportionality-based reasoning recently engaged in the European Court 
of Human Right’s abortion jurisprudence.48 While the European Court of 
Human Rights declined, in A, B, and C v Ireland (2011) 53 EHRR 13 to 
recognise any general right to abortion under the European Convention of 
Human Rights, it has recognised in this case and in others that abortion 
restrictions by member states engage the Article 8 right to freedom of 
private and family life, and thus must be justified as necessary and 
proportionate under Article 8(2). In some recent decisions, the Court 
                                                        
46 ibid, 54. 
 
47 Greenhouse and Siegel, n 4 above, 1460. 
 
48 See V. Undurraga, ‘Proportionality in the Constitutional Review of Abortion Law’, in R. 
Cook, B. Dickens and J. Erdman (eds), Abortion Law in Transnational Perspective: Cases 
and Controverises (University of Pennsylvania Press 2014), and R. Scott, ‘Risk, Reasons 
and Rights: The European Convention on Human Rights and English Abortion Law’ 
(2016) 4 Med Law Rev, 1-33.  
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employed what Veronica Undurraga terms the ‘strict proportionality’ test 
when addressing justifications for abortion restrictions. 49  That test 
involves asking questions such as whether criminalization is in fact 
effective in protecting unborn human life, whether there are alternative 
means of protection less onerous for women than criminalization, and 
whether the costs of abortion restrictions for women are worth their net 
gain. 
 
As Greenhouse and Siegel also argue, a weighted balancing test can 
be a useful tool for ‘smoking out unconstitutional motivation’ in 
legislating—a key concern in Casey—without having to allege bad faith on 
the part lawmakers.50 The imposition of meaningful obstacles to abortion 
for meagre or questionable health gains surely counts as good evidence for 
illicit constitutional purpose. But on the weighted balancing test, such 
regulations will fail constitutional review without any reference to 
legislative purpose. And it is clear that any number of measures that 
might pass the straightforward two-limb test would fail when their 
benefits are weighed against their burdens. Consequently, the Court’s 
application of the weighted balancing test, if carried forward, marks a 
crucial turning point for abortion rights protection in the US. 
 
 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS PROTECTION 
 
In Planned Parenthood v Casey the Supreme Court declared that a 
restriction on abortion which claims to be health-protective is 
unconstitutional if it ‘serve[s] no purpose other than to make abortions 
more difficult’.51 The provisions at issue in Whole Woman’s Health were 
paradigm examples of such regulations. The majority judgment 
demonstrated an intention to take the ‘undue burden’ standard of review 
in Casey seriously, and to engage in rigorous assessment of fact and 
evidence in order to strike down unconstitutional abortion measures. The 
Court’s decision made clear that states can no longer attempt to obstruct 
abortion under the pretence of protecting women’s health and expect an 
easy pass through constitutional review. 
 
 The Court’s particular interpretation of the Casey standard in this 
case heralds more rigorous scrutiny of abortion regulations than we have 
seen in the Supreme Court in the recent past, including in Gonzales v 
Carhart. In particular, it is interesting to imagine what the Court’s 
interpretation of Casey in Whole Woman’s Health would entail when 
applied to legislative measures that purport to serve the other recognised 
                                                        
49 V. Undurraga, ibid. 
 
50 Greenhouse and Siegel, n 4 above, 1475. 
 
51 Casey, n 2 above, 901. 
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legitimate state aim of protecting fetal life. Examples of such fetal-
protective measures include the numerous ‘informed consent’ and 
mandatory ultrasound provisions enacted by many states in an attempt to 
dissuade women from going through with abortion,52 as well as the federal 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 2003, upheld in Gonzales, which 
purportedly aimed at protecting late fetal life. It seems that Whole 
Woman’s Health has two main ramifications for the constitutionality of 
‘fetal-protective’ abortion measures the next time they face challenge. 
First, states might have to demonstrate that a fetal-protective measure is 
in fact in the service of meeting its stated aim, meaning that it does, or in 
all likelihood will, save at least some fetal lives, and not only make 
abortion more cumbersome or distressing for women. As an example, the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 2003 might well fail such a test if it were 
clearly established that the law does not prevent late abortions, but only, 
in the main, directs doctors to use a different method for late abortion.  
Second, applying the weighted balancing test, states may need to show 
that fetal-protective measures protect enough fetal lives as not to be 
‘undue’ when weighed against the effects of the restriction. On a test like 
this, a mandatory ultrasound provision could be invalidated if its 
dissuasive success rate is not worth the additional burdens it imposes on 
women, even if mild, and especially if significant. 
 
 These potential implications are even more important when 
considered in the context of abortion rights protection in the US. Despite 
the Supreme Court’s declaration of a constitutional right to abortion in 
Roe v Wade, abortion access is far more obstructed in many US states 
than it is in Britain, where abortion is, by default, a criminal offence.53 
Along with blocks on government abortion funding, one main reason for 
this is the application of the Casey standard of constitutional review, 
which has not traditionally probed the factual basis of regulatory 
justifications, or weighed them against their burdens. (In Casey itself, the 
Court upheld all of the disputed provisions, including an abortion-
dissuasive counselling requirement, 24 hour mandatory waiting period 
and parental consent requirement for minors, with the single exception of 
a spousal notification requirement.)54 It has been relatively easy for state 
legislatures to hinder the abortion right, so long as they do not do so 
substantially, just by alleging their intention to promote women’s health 
or fetal life through its measures. The standard of scrutiny conducted in 
Whole Woman’s Health may mark a sea change in this respect. The 
majority made clear that it is not incumbent on reviewing courts to take 
the legislature’s regulatory justifications at face value, or to agree with the 
                                                        
52 See C. Sanger, ‘Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a 
Protected Choice ’ (2008) 56 UCLA L Rev 351.  
 
53 See the Abortion Act 1967, s1, along with the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 
58-60, and the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929, s 1.  
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legislature’s balancing of the benefits and burdens of its abortion 
restrictions. Most crucially, no longer can pro-life politicians attempt to 
impede or obstruct abortion access on counterfeit health-based grounds 
and expect their legislation to survive constitutional review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
